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In this paper, using the models from the economic literature, the authors study the credibility level of 
National Bank of Romania (NRB) during the time span Mars 2007 – Mars 2008. We will use three types of 
credibility indexes - two from the economic literature and one proposed by the authors. Also, we will 
emphasize  the  impact  of  unpredictable  shocks  -  the  natural  calamities  (drought)  which  affected  the 
aggregate supply in the summer of 2007 and the depreciation of RON against the euro - on the NBR 
credibility. 
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1. Monetary policy credibility in the economic literature 
Blinder (1999) defines credibility as “words matching deeds. A central bank is credible if people believe it 
will do what it says”. [Svensson, L.E.O. (1999), p. 23]. The correspondence between inflation target and 
private  inflation  expectations  shows  high  level  of  credibility,  while  the  deviations  of  private  inflation 
expectations from the inflation target indicates a lack of credibility (both when inflation expectations are 
above and below the target). Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) define credibility as “the absolute value of the 
difference  between  policymakers’  plans  and  the  public’s  beliefs  about  those  plans”  [Lyziak,  T.; 
Mackiewicz, J.; Stanislawska, E. (2005), p. 4]. They believe the level of credibility influence the speed 
with which the public learns about changes in policymakers’ objectives. When the society reacts slowly to 
changes  in  the  objectives  of  the  monetary  policy  they  assume  that  central  bank  has  a  lower  level  of 
credibility. 
Most of the central banks are obsessed by their credibility. Knowing the benefits of a credible monetary 
policy we understand and sustain their obsession for being credible. Svensson identifies the advantages of a 
credible central bank [Svensson, L.E.O. (1999), p. 25]: 
−  a high level of credibility reduce the variability of the real economic variables (output and 
output gap). As a consequence, there is less need for the central bank interventions’ in the real 
activity in order to keep inflation close to target. So, the central bank can easily achieve its 
target; 
−  the impact of nominal interest rate on the real interest rate is more stable and predictable. 
According to Fischer equation, when inflation expectations are stable and close to target, the 
only factor that influence the real interest rate is the nominal interest rate; 
−  avoid the liquidity trap – a situation whit a major surplus of liquidity in economy and nominal 
interest  rates  very  close  to  zero.  In  this  situation,  the  real  interest  rate  has  an  opposite 
evolution from the inflation expectations level: when the real interest rate is positive – the 
inflation  expectations  are  negative,  that  means  the  society  expects  to  occur  a  deflation 
phenomenon. In this circumstance the monetary policy effects are very weak and the central 
bank can’t control the economy throughout the interest rate channel. 
−   
−  Although is easy to define, the central bank credibility is difficult to measure. Due to this 
aspect, in the economic literature we do not have a commonly accepted index to measure the   498 
level  of  central  bank  monetary  policy  credibility.  The  existing  indexes  measure  the  gap 
between the inflation expectations and monetary policy target. We will present two of these 
methods. 
Lyziak, Mackiewicz ￿i Stanislawska (2005, p. 5) consider that the level of credibility can be measured as a 
difference between the private inflation expectations and the inflation target: 
  e target
t + 1 t t + 1 IC1 =  ￿ - ￿   (1) 
where: IC1 – level of credibility at the moment t, 
e
t + 1 t ￿  - the private inflation expectations for the period 
t+1, 
target
t + 1 ￿  - the inflation target for the period t+1. The method does not make difference between the 
positive and the negative deviations of inflation expectations. Moreover, due to the fact that results are 
expressed in percentages, we believe that the obtained values do not clearly reflect the level of central bank 
credibility.  
To increase the results relevance, we compare the value obtained for IC1 with the inflation target. For 
example, a 3% difference between expectations and target may illustrate a high level of confidence if the 
target is 15%, but, in the same time, it may illustrate a low level of confidence if the target is 2%. As a 
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where: ￿
e – the private inflation expectations and ￿
target – the inflation target. The result will fall between 0 
– that means a very weak level of credibility – and 1 – that represents the maximum level of credibility. 
In order to eliminate the weaknesses of the formula (1), Cecchetti and Krause use another index. They 
consider that a lower level for private inflations expectations than the inflation target does not affect the 
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where: ￿
e – the private inflation expectations and ￿
target – the inflation target. If the result is close to 1 the 
level of credibility is high. Moreover, they consider a level of private inflation expectations grater that 20% 
similar with the absence of central bank credibility. When the society expects a level of inflation lower 
than the target they consider the level of credibility for the central bank as being maxim. 
2. Method and results 
Using the methods presented previously, we will evaluate the National Bank of Romania (NBR) level of 
credibility. NBR adopted inflation targeting as monetary policy in august 2005 and, from that moment on, 
our  central  bank  announced  its  targets.  At  the  beginning  the  targets  were  established  for  the  next  6 
trimesters,  while  now  are  announced  for  the  next  8  trimesters.  We  evaluated  the  level  of  inflation 
expectations using a questionnaire. In order to determine the evolution of inflation expectations of the 
people  from  Transylvania,  the  authors  applied  the  questionnaire  during  the  time  span  Mars  2007  – 
February  2008.  Regarding  the  private  inflation  expectations,  we  collected  two  types  of  data:  the  first 
category refers to the level of expected inflation rate at the end of 2007 and the second category refers to 
the  level  of  expected  inflation  rate  for  the  following  12  months  from  the  moment  of  answer.  In 
consequence, we will take into consideration two inflation targets: firstly, the target announced by NBR for 
the end of 2007 and secondly the target announced for 2008 and 2009.   499 
Firstly we will evaluate the NBR credibility regarding the achievement of the inflation target at the end of 
2007. The expected level of inflation rate is evaluated using the results obtained at the following question: 
According to your estimations, the inflation rate at the end of the current year will fall between: <0% / 0 – 
0.9% / 1 – 1.9% /  ... / 9 – 9.9% / > 10%. In the quantification process we took the central value of each 
interval as being the representative value. In the case of <0% and >10%, we consider as representative 
values  -0.5% and 10.5%. Their frequencies being  very low, these two  values did not have a relevant 
influence on the final result. We analyzed this aspect also in January 2008, due to the fact that NBR did not 
announce the inflation rate for 2007. Starting from these assumptions and applying the formula (1), we 




























Figure 1 – Evolution of IC1 regarding inflation rate at the end of 2007 
Source: authors’ calculation and NBR 
As we can see from figure 1, until July 2007, NBR credibility rise – the value of IC1 become closer to 0. 
The  natural  calamities  that  affected  the  agriculture  during  the  summer  raise  the  population’s  inflation 
expectations,  starting  the  decline  of  NBR  credibility.  The  RON  depreciation  against  the  euro  (more 





































Figure 2 - Evolution of IC1adjusted regarding inflation rate at the end of 2007 
Source: authors’ calculation and NBR 
Analyzing the evolution of IC1adjusted we can draw other conclusions. Looking at the figure 2, we can 
observe that, as a result of not fulfilling its inflation target, NBR loosed appreciatively 30% from the 
credibility that our central bank had at the middle of year 2007. In spite of the fact that NBR intensified its 
communications with the society - explaining that the causes of the target fail were not its fault - the private 
inflation expectations could not be maintained low. As a result, at the end of 2007 the private inflation 
expectations of population were high. 
The evolution of IC2 – created by Cecchetti and Krause - is similar with the evolution of the previous two 
indexes, confirming that a stable economic environment, without major unpredictable shocks, lead to an 
increase  in  the  NBR  credibility,  while  the  lags  between  the  NBR  reaction  to  these  shocks  and  the 
appearance of the decisions’ effects in economy will inevitably elevate the level of inflation expectations 
and decrease the central bank credibility. We have to mention that these lags are inevitable. While the   500 
shocks  that  hit  our  economy  were  unpredictable,  the  NBR  could  not  react  previously  (before  their 
manifestation). Although NBR reacted promptly, the effects of its monetary policy decisions will be seen 
only after a few months (at least 6 months), period of time during which the inflation expectations are 



























Figure 3 - Evolution of IC2 regarding inflation rate at the end of 2007 
Source: authors’ calculation and NBR 
Now we will evaluate the NBR credibility using the probability method developed by Carlson and Parkin 
(1975) to estimate the inflation expectations. The data collected from  the questionnaire allowed  us  to 
estimate the expected inflation rate for the period Mars 2008 – Mars 2009. In order to gather the necessary 
date, we used the following question: By comparison with the past 12 months, do you expect that the 
consumer price will: increase more rapidly / increase at the same rate / increase at a slower rate / stay 

















































Figure 4 - Evolution of IC1 regarding inflation rate for the next 12 months (t+12) 
Source: authors’ calculation and NBR 
As we can see in figure 4, when our economy was stable and inflation was falling (until June 2007), the 
credibility of NBR was very high: the private inflation expectations for the following 12 months (from the 
moment of the answer to questionnaire) were even lower than the inflation target announced by NBR 
(during months April, May and June 2007). The natural calamities from the 2007 summer raised a little the 
private expectation for the next 12 months, but the expected inflation rate remained very close to the target. 
The  penury  of  agricultural  products  and  the  RON  depreciation  against  the  euro,  raised  the  prices  of 
imported vegetables and fruits, having a very consistent influence on the inflation rate. In fact, all other 
imported goods determined the raise of consumer prices, but the price of fruits and vegetables had the 
biggest effect on inflation.  
The evolution of IC1adjusted reveals the same conclusions as IC1. Additionally, this credibility index shows a 
great loss of credibility for the NBR: at the beginning of 2008, the population confidence in inflation target 
achievement  for  this  year  was  very  low.  More  than  that,  in  the  first  months  of  2008,  the  differences 
between the expected inflation rate for the next 12 moths and the corresponding inflation target was grater 
that the target level. As a consequence, the value of IC1adjusted will be zero. In figure 5 we represented the 




























































Figure 5 - Evolution of IC1adjusted regarding inflation rate for the next 12 months (t+12) 
Source: authors’ calculation and NBR 
Analyzing the evolution of IC2 we obtain the same results as in the case of previous credibility indexes. 
For the time span April – June 2008 the level of expected inflation is lower than the inflation target, NBR 
having a maximum level of credibility (100%). The lowest level of credibility is attained in February 2008, 
where the difference between the expected inflation rate for the next 12 months and the corresponding 


















































Figure 6 - Evolution of IC2 regarding inflation rate for the next 12 months (t+12) 
Source: authors’ calculation and NBR 
3. Conclusions 
Analyzing the results obtained, we consider that the society has an adaptive behavior in the formation of its 
inflation expectations. That means, people form their expectations about what will happen in the future 
with inflation based on what happened in the past. Although the communication actions of NBR were 
intensive – explaining the factors that raised the inflation pressures in our economy – NBR could not stop 
the loss of credibility. Moreover, the release of predictions regarding the future evolution of inflation could 
not attenuate the NBR loss of credibility. As a result, we consider that, at this moment, society is more 
influenced by the current evolution of inflation than by the actions took by NBR in order to calm down the 
inflation pressures. 
In our opinion, the time span from the inflation targeting adoption and the summer of 2007 was too short to 
facilitate  a  credibility  gain  as  the  result  of  this  monetary  policy  implementation.  The  NBR  previous 
successes in its fight against inflation – the consolidation of disinflation process and the RON appreciation 
against the euro – were the main causes of the NBR credibility until the summer of 2007. Unfortunately, 
these two reasons were not enough in order to attenuate the negative effects of the first major shock that hit 
our economy after the inflation targeting adoption.  
We think that the negative shock suffered by the aggregate supply in 2007 represented the first true test for 
the credibility of society in NBR capacity to control the evolution of inflation. Neither the current high   502 
level of  transparency  nor the existent credibility could anchor the private inflation expectations.  As a 
consequence we believe that NBR failed the credibility test. Additionally, we can see that a high level of 
transparency is not enough to maintain the central bank credibility. Considering that our economy is in the 
first years of inflation targeting monetary policy, NBR have to obtain remarkable results in its fight against 
inflation – reduction and stability of inflation rate – in order to anchor the future inflation expectations. 
Furthermore, to ameliorate the society adaptive behavior, NBR need to raise the society’s information and 
knowledge level regarding inflation phenomenon. 
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